Abstract-The advancements in the power grid due to integration of new technology arises concerns regarding its reliability in terms of performance and security. On one hand, the gradual shift towards renewable energy sources leads to rise in uncertainty in terms of control and demand satisfaction. On the other hand, the integration of communication devices in order to make the grid smart increases its vulnerability to malicious activity. Automatic Generation Control (AGC) which is needed to maintain the system frequency and inter-area exchange has an important place in both the concerns. This paper presents an attack-defense analysis on the AGC operation of the power grid under varying conditions of renewables. It has two main contributions. First, a cyber-attack is conducted on the AGC algorithm with various levels of renewable penetration, to analyze the effect of an attack with renewables. Then a new algorithm for AGC using a PID control based approach is used and the attack is repeated to evaluate the impact. Secondly, an algorithm for attack mitigation is designed and its performance is analyzed with both the AGC algorithms. The various factors considered are effectiveness in reducing the impact on the system and adverse effects on normal operations. The experiments were conducted using the PowerCyber CPS security testbed at Iowa State University.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid consisting of complex power network which are inter-connected with sophisticated communication network faces increasing challenges in reliability, security and stability with its growth. As the shift to sustainable energy sources is on the rise, the reliability of stable power delivery becomes more fragile [5] . The need for superior control methods in order to counter the effects of uncertainty and instability introduced by the renewable sources is evident. An even greater problem is the growing threat of malicious activity in cyber-space. With the push towards making the grid smarter, critical industrial control systems (ICS) such as the power grid have become as vulnerable to cyber threats, as their counterparts in information technology such as banking, share markets, service sectors, etc. This is further undermined by the retention of legacy equipment in order to optimize costs and complexity faced during the transformation. With increasing interdependence between the physical and cyber networks [15] , the impact of any attack can be astronomical. The December 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid which affected thousands is one of the most sophisticated attack on the power grid [17] . The ability of the attackers in performing long-term reconnaissance operations to learn about the system and a highly synchronized attack, served as an eye opener and a wakeup call in coming to terms with the fact that these events are far from being merely an unpleasant hypothesis.
Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) operations, viz., State Estimation (SE), Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) and Automatic Generation Control (AGC) that are essential in maintaining the physical layer, depend heavily on the information from the communication layer. AGC is an application that is performed very frequently, typically 2-8 seconds due to the necessity of constant regulation of the grid frequency. As a result, attacks on AGC generally have immediate impact. There has been extensive research in analyzing attacks and impacts on WAMPAC applications. Siddharth et al. provide a descriptive analysis for various attacks on AGC operation, and also provides an effective mitigation algorithm employing a model based attack detection that uses real time load forecast [6] . The paper in [7] describes attack models for integrity and DoS attacks, and develops templates for attack on AGC. Tan et al. in [8] discuss an optimal approach towards developing an attack vector on AGC by analyzing the impacts on the system due to several attacks based on captured sensor measurements and system data. In [16] , Vivek et al. discuss an approach to stealthy cyber-attacks on RAS operation of a power grid using a coordinated attack involving malware based system corruption and modification of signals, considering multiple values of the attack parameter.
Another grave concern is the effect of the presence of renewable in the event of a cyber-attack. This is an area that has seen very useful, although limited exploration. In [9] , Ayar et al. propose a nonlinear distributed controller that improves transient stability margins of synchronous generators by means of distributed storage systems, that helps during disturbances caused due to cyber-attacks, while also considering resilience to time delays that are introduced during communication. Giovanna et al. conducts a cyber risk assessment study and suitable mitigation by means of security measures, on the voltage regulation of medium voltage equipment that connect Distributed Energy Resources (DER) to the rest of the grid, in [11] . Moness et al. presents an overview of Internet of Energy (IoE) and next generation Wind Energy Control Systems (WECS) while considering the challenges of integration and concerns about cyber security in [13] .
In spite of all these valuable contributions, there is a scarcity of research related to the attack-defense analysis of WAMPAC applications in the presence of renewable energy sources. This paper aims to bridge the gap by conducting an 978-1-5386-7138-2/18/$31.00 © 2018 IEEE attack defense study on the AGC operation of the smart grids with renewables integrated. The two primary objectives of this paper are to analyze the effect of cyber-attacks on a power grid with renewables integrated, and to provide an effective mitigation strategy against the attack in the context of AGC.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II describes two AGC algorithms used in the study, viz., conventional AGC and PID based AGC, and introduces the attack considered. Section III presents a strategy for mitigation against the attack. Section IV describes the hardware implementation to perform the experiments using the PowerCyber testbed at Iowa State University. Section V provides a case study delivering a descriptive analysis of the attack-defense scenarios. Finally, Section VI provides the conclusions obtained and scope for future study.
II. OVERVIEW OF AGC AND RAMP ATTACK
In this section, we provide an overview of AGC, the two AGC schemes implemented in this paper and introduce the attack model considered in this study.
AGC is a wide area control operation that is used for (i) Maintaining the system nominal frequency by balancing the generation with the load, and (ii) Maintaining the tie line flows between the balancing areas. Both the schemes employ Area Control Error (ACE) calculated from the frequency and tie line flow deviations every 2-8 seconds as follows:
where, β -frequency bias factor ∆f -frequency deviation ∆P i -power flow deviation of tie line i
The control signal generated from the computed ACE value is send to the actuator. In the next two subsections, we will talk about the two different control schemes which differ in the computing the ACE values.
A. Conventional AGC
This is the traditional method of AGC in which the ACE values are consecutively added up to generate the control signal. The control input C(t) at time 't' is given by:
B. Proportional Integral Derivative (PID) ACE based AGC
The traditional method can be rewritten in PID form as a version of a discrete PI type controller with both K p and K i equal to 1. This is done by considering the current ACE as the proportional component and the sum of previous errors as the integral component.
By using variable parameters and including a derivative component consisting of the difference between the current and its previous error, a PID form of AGC can be constructed.
C. Ramp Attack A ramp attack was chosen for analysis, mainly to provide characterization for the attack behaviour so that the system performance can be quantified with respect to renewable penetration. This is less feasible with other attacks.
During the attack, a constant ACE value is sent to the generator station for the attack duration, resulting in a constant increase or decrease of the generator output which leads to a constant rise or drop in system frequency. A significant drop in frequency will cause adverse conditions leading to performance criteria violation, under-frequency load shedding, generation trip and loss of turbine life. The generator control signal after the attack has started is given by:
where, C(t) -control signal before attack E a -attack magnitude t a -attack duration
The main motivation for deploying the PID based AGC is that it can be tuned smartly which can significantly reduce the impact of cyber attacks on the system stability which is not possible in the conventional AGC. In this scheme, we have selected the parameters such that it performs optimally during normal operation as well as provide proper mitigation when the attack is detected, making it attack-resilient control scheme. The proportional parameter, K p , is retained as 1 to ensure that that the most recent updates in the control are provided during that ACE values first cycle. We have assigned the value of derivative parameter, K d , to 0.01 to provide the derivative control actions based on the rate of change of ACE value. The integral parameter, K i , plays a critical role as it can provide appropriate mitigation during the attack. Based on our detailed analysis, we have observed that the assigning the value to 0.5 provides the satisfactory load frequency control during the attack. Thus, it helps to reduce the effect of past ACE values and bring down damage during the ramping attacks by approximately half.
III. ATTACK MITIGATION
This section discusses a mitigation algorithm that can prevent the attack from affecting the system beyond certain limits. The algorithm for mitigation is shown in the flowchart in Fig. 1 . After obtaining the ACE and frequency values every cycle, two conditions are checked:
1) The values are checked to be within a pair of bounds.
2) The sign of ACE is checked with the frequency value to ensure the ACE helps to improve frequency conditions, i.e. for a system frequency less than 60 Hz, only a positive ACE value (ramp up signal) will be allowed, and vice-versa.
If either condition is violated, the ACE value is dropped and replaced with 0. By this a ramp attack would be stopped immediately during the excursive ACE values as defined by condition 1, or after the first few cycles when condition 2 would not be satisfied, if the attack value was within limits.
The bounds are determined using the data used by regulators for determining the performance parameters of the AGC (viz. Control Performance Standards -CPS1 and CPS2) and the Balancing Authority ACE Limits (BAAL) [6] . The data consists of one-minute average values of frequency and ACE for a total period of 12 months which are updated every month. The bounds for each frequency range are the largest ACE values observed for that range in the past 12 months. Fig.  2 describes the method for deriving the ACE bounds.
This mitigation strategy assumes that the generating sta- 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
The experiments were performed on an IEEE 39 bus system, modelled using ePHASORsim library of Matlab/Simulink and simulated in OP5600 HILbox manufactured by OPAL-RT Technologies. The system is divided into two Balancing Authorities (BAs) as shown in Fig. 3 . Generators 1 & 8, and 2 & 3 are involved in AGC operation in BA1 and BA2 respectively. The model was modified to simulate renewable energy sources. Generators 4, 5 and 9 were converted to renewable plants successively for simulating increasing penetration. The individual machines in the plants, were simulated with an input value subject to 1% fluctuation, to simulate the variation in the wind turbine output.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION USING IEEE 39 BUS SYSTEM

A. Attack analysis
The ramp attack was conducted on two cases -attack on one ACE and two ACE values, for four different conditions of renewable penetration 0%, 10%, 20% and 30%. The increase in renewable penetration has two consequences on the grid: 1) Fluctuating output power leading to frequency fluctuations 2) Reduction in system inertia leading to faster frequency response and higher rate of change of frequency (ROCOF)
The ACE value was attacked and replaced with -5 MW for a duration of 1 minute (60 seconds or 15 AGC cycles) causing a drop of 75 MW of generation. When both the ACE signals are attacked there is a drop of 150 MW. From the plot shown in Fig. 4 , it can be inferred that with increase in renewables, due to reduction of inertia, the ROCOF is higher and the drop in frequency due to the attack is faster. The attack was then repeated for the same scenarios with PID based AGC. Due to the reduced control signal used by this algorithm, by the end of 2 minutes the reduction in generation was only 40 MW for attack on 1 ACE, and 80 MW for attack on 2 ACE values. This results in lesser frequency drop as shown in Fig. 5 . Thus, it can be inferred that attack on PID based AGC has lesser impact. The results obtained during the attack analysis are summarized in Table I . Furthermore, the study was also performed on the performance of the PID based AGC as compared to the conventional AGC. Based on a two minute observation of the two algorithms for the four cases of renewable penetration, it was observed that for the considered system conditions, PID base AGC algorithm provides a satisfactory performance that is as good as the conventional algorithm, since it manages to maintain the steady state frequency error within the frequency regulation requirements (18 mHz) as shown in Fig. 6 .
B. Defense analysis
The ramp attack was conducted for the same attack magnitude and duration with the mitigation algorithm in place for both the AGC methods, with varying conditions of renewables, and with attacks on single and multiple ACE values. It was observed that the attack was prevented during the AGC cycles for which condition 2 was not satisfied. Condition 1 was not violated as the attack magnitude was small. This resulted in the possibility of the attack being rarely successful and the successful ones having negligible impact. Fig. 7 shows the impact of the attack on both ACE values for conventional AGC with the mitigation implemented.
C. Effect of mitigation on AGC performance
From the algorithm, it is evident that an alert would be generated whenever the ACE signals have opposite signs. This will result in a high incidence of false positives as this condition is observed most of the time. So, it is important to ensure that the normal AGC operation is not adversely affected by the mitigation. The AGC operation was simulated with the mitigation in place for both AGC algorithms and different conditions of renewables. Due to frequency being the primary factor in the algorithm, the system tends to restore frequency within the permissible errors of 18 mHz without any hindrance, despite the false positives. To further validate AGC performance, an analysis was conducted by means of a step change in two of the loads. One load in BA1 and one in BA2 were subject to an increase and decrease of 50 MW respectively as shown in Fig. 3 . In this case, both the BAs would need to achieve a ramp up and ramp down in their generation by an equal amount, while being allowed to do only one at a time and needing longer time for restoration. It was observed that the system performance was satisfactory with the Fig. 8 shows the frequency restoration. Even though the frequency performance appears to be inferior, there is a very less possibility of violation. This seemingly inferior performance is because at any instant, the machines in the grid are allowed to either ramp up or down, but not both. However, because of condition 2 in the mitigation algorithm the frequency deviation in any direction will always be facing an aggressive opposition. This would cause relatively greater frequency swings as compared to the system without mitigation. From the lower plot, it was observed that the tie line restoration occurs at fairly the same duration with or without mitigation.
D. Effect of mitigation on contingency response
Current NERC regulations defined by BAL-002 standards, require the grid to restore its ACE to zero or a pre-disturbance value (i.e. normal operation) within 15 minutes following any disturbance [19] . During such situations, the ACE values could possibly be higher than those observed during normal operation. This operation might be at a risk if the mitigation algorithm is used as condition 1 limits the ACE to bounds based on values that were previously observed. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the impact of the mitigation on contingency response.
For the analysis, three types of contingencies have been considered as shown in Fig. 3 . From [18] , it was found that on an average more than 100 events have occurred from 2010 to 2014 in the Eastern interconnection alone. So, in our analysis, we assume that the data used for generating the ACE bounds contain values observed during a contingency. 1) Contingency on a non-critical line: A non-critical line is one which when subject to an event does not cause any observable drop in load or generation. For such scenarios, the ACE values are not expected to be very high. A single N-1 contingency was simulated by disconnecting the line indicated in Fig. 3 , and the system response for restoring the normal operation of the grid was observed. The experiment was conducted for the system with and without the mitigation algorithm. Fig. 9 shows the plots that depict the performance of the grid during the above-mentioned scenarios. It was observed that for simple contingencies such as the one on a non-critical line, presence of the mitigation does not impact the recovery as shown in plot.
2) Contingency on a tie-line: The second analysis was a contingency on one of the tie-lines indicated in Fig. 3 . In such situations, a significant tie-line error and hence a higher ACE value can be expected. The analysis was conducted on two cases -system that has a history of such a contingency in the past 12 months, and a system without history of such an event. In the second case, we assume history of a simple contingency. The performance of the system is shown in the plot in Fig. 10 . From the plot, it was observed that the presence of the mitigation algorithm does not impact the contingency response of the grid for the considered tie-line loss, regardless of history of contingencies. This can be due to the fact that for the contingency considered, there was not any significant drop in generation or load. Although with history of a tie- Fig. 11 . Contingency on a non-critical line line contingency, the frequency deviation was lesser, the steady state conditions were achieved at fairly the same duration.
3) Most Severe Single Contingency (MSSC): The final analysis was performed for the MSSC of the system. Such a contingency would cause the maximum possible impact on the system due to a single event. From Fig. 3 , it can be seen that the loss of the indicated line would disconnect Generators 4 and 5 causing a severe drop in system generation and hence frequency. Such a situation would require extremely high values of ACE, which are rarely observed, to restore normal operation. The analysis was conducted for the system with and without mitigation, and with and without history of the considered contingency. From the plots in Fig. 11 , it was observed that for a system without history, due to the high ACE values required for restoration, it is not possible to respond to an MSSC. If a system has history of a MSSC, recovery is possible within the required duration as shown in the figure.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper makes two contributions. First, an analysis was conducted on cyber-attacks on the power grid with renewables integrated. A ramp attack was carried out on the AGC operation under different conditions and the ill-effects that increasing renewable penetration posed in the face of an attack were observed. A faster drop in frequency was observed with increase in renewable penetration level. An alternative algorithm employing a PID based approach, with the aim of diminishing the impact of cyber-attacks was introduced, and its performance analyzed under different scenarios. Secondly, a two-step mitigation strategy was developed and validated in terms of defense effectiveness and efficiency of system operation. Although the load frequency control was suspended for the duration of the attack, the damage caused by the attack in the previous case was greatly avoided. An analysis on the false positives generated by the mitigation on the AGC performance was also conducted, and satisfactory performance was observed. An analysis of the effect on contingency response was also performed, and it was observed that, for contingencies resulting in a significant drop in load and/or generation, the response was poor unless the system had experienced similar event during the previous 12 months. Satisfactory response was observed for events that were less damaging.
Further research on this topic would include analysis of various developments for renewables, like battery storage integration, distributed generation, etc. and development and analysis of new types of attacks. Also, there is a need for improvement of the mitigation algorithm to a resilient algorithm that can help the system to correct its frequency deviations, using data from forecast, governor response data or peer-topeer interaction.
